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[So F. No. 21035.

In Bank. Oct. 4, 1962.]

MARY HELEN MACHADO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
JOHN R. MACHADO, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Husband and Wife - Community and Separate PropertyProfits of Business.-The part of the profits of a separate. property enterprise attributable to the husband's efforts are community property, whether the enterprise be classified as
"commercial" or "agricultural."
[2] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business.
-The net income derived from the husband's devotion, during
the marriage, of all his working time and energy to farming
and dairy operations on his separately owned real property
should have becn apportioned in the divorce de.cree between
the husband's separate property and the community property.
Unless expenditures for family living expenses exceeded the
amount apportioned to the community property,community
funds were. used for some of the payments for real and personal property purchased by the husband, thus giving the
community an interest in one or more of the items found to
be the husband's separate property.
[3a, 3b] Id.-Determination of Character of Property-Evidence.The presumption of joint tenancy arising from the fact that the
deed to the spouses' home was put in joint tenancy was not
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 21, 22; Am.Jm.,
Community Property (1st ed § 32).
McE.. Dig. References: [1, 2] Husband and Wife, § 58; [3, 4]
Husband and Wife, § 92; [5] Building and Loan Associations, § 3;
[6,7] Husband and Wife, § 93; [8] Divorce, §§ 219,220; [9,10]
Divorce, § 219; [11] Divorce, § 297; [12,13] Divorce, § 242.
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overcome where, though the hUt;band testified· that he did not
intend to givc Ids wife nn interest in the home, there was no
evidence of a comlllon unde.rstnllding or agreement between the
spouses that the property was to be held by them in other than
joint tenancy.
[4] ld.-Determination of Character of Property-Evidence.-AIthough a joint tennncy <leed is not eonclusive as to the character of real property, it creates a rebuttable presumption
that it is held in joint tenancy, and such presumption cannot
be overcome by testimony of the hidden intentions of one of the
parties, but only by evidence tending to prove a common understanding or an agreement that the character of the property
was to be other than joint tenancy.
[6] Building and Loan Associations-Members-Joint Tenants.The langunge of Fin. Code, § 7602, providing that when sbares
or investment certificates of a building and loan association
are issued in the name of two or more persons as joint tenants
or in form to be pnid to any of them or the survivors of them,
such shares or certificates and all dues paid thereon become
the property of such persons as joint tenants, creates a rebuttable presumption of joint tenancy that may be overcome by
proof that the owner of the funds, wheu making the deposit,
did not intend to create a true joint teu!lncy.
[6] Husband and Wife-Determination of Character of PropertyQuestions of Fact.-Whether the presumption arising under
Fin. Code, § 7602, that a joint savings and loan association account was held in joint tennncy was overcome was a question
of fact.
[7] ld.-Determination of Character of Property-Judgment.Whe.re the husband withdrew all the money from the spouses'
joint savings and loan account without his wife's consent immediately after the parties separated, transferring part of the
funds to a new account established in his and another person's
name and receiving a check for tbe remainder of the funds as
to the disposition of which he offered no evidence, the trial
court sbould have provided in the judgment of divorce that the
husband account for half the llmount of the joint account at
the time it was closed.
[8] Divorce-Disposition of Property-Separate Property.-In a
divorce action, the court does not have authority to award any
of the s~arate propcrty of one spouse to the other, nor can
it award the wife exclusive possession of real property owned
by the spouses as joint tenants, except as provided in Civ.
Code, § 157, relnting to temporary exclusion of either spouse
from the family dwelliug or from the dwelling of the other
until final determination of the action.
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, §§ 288,293.
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[9] ld. - Disposition of Property - Exclusion of Spause From
Dwelling.-The purpose of Civ. Code, § 157, authorizing the
court in di,orce proccedings to mnkc orde.rs for the temporary
exclusion of either spouse from the family dwelling or from
the dwclling of the other until the final detel'mination of the
action, is to protect the spouse's right to the exclusive occupancy of his or her or the family dwelling pending final determination of the nction.
[10] ld..-Disposition of Property-Family Dwelling.-In a divorce
proceeding, it was error for the court to award the wife
not simply the exclusive right to occupy the family dwelling,
held by the spouses in joint tenancy, but also the exclusive
right to use it in any way she might see fit, especially where
such order was not limited in time to the final determination of
the action.
[11] ld.-Support of Children-Amount of Award.-Defendant
husband had the ability to pay a child support award of $75
per month for cach of the couple's two minor children where
the husband's total income for the last five ye.ars of the marriage averaged nbout $300 per month after payment of federal
income tax(>!':, and he owned assets of substantial value.
[12a, 12b] ld.-Restraining Orders.-An injunction that had been
issued in a divorce case enjoining the husband from "molesting" and "annoying" the wife was not rendered void for vagueness and uncertainty by use of the quoted words where the
husband on several occasions made unfounded accusations
that the wife had committed adultery and used abusive language in her presence, where he twice parkcd his truck within
sight of the family home and a strange man came from the
truck to the front door of the house and asked the wife if a
"sporting girl" was there, and where the husband sometimes
locked the wife out of the house lute at night so that once she
was required to have a policeman help her gain entry.
[13] ld.-Restraining Orders.-The language of an injunction in a
divorce case enjoining the husband from "molesting" and
"annoying" the wife must be interpreted in the light of the
record which discloses the type of conduct enjoined.

APPEALS from parts of a judgment of the Superior Court
of Merced County. R. R. Sischo, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Action for divorce. Parts of judgment awarding alimony
and child support, determining character of certain property
and enjoining defendant from molesting or annoying plaintiff,
affirmed; remainder of portion of jQdgment appealed from
reversed.
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Kane & Canelo and Thomas J. Kane, Jr., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Natalie J. Holly for Defendant and Appellant.
TRAYNOR, J.-The trial court entered an interlocutory decree of divorce in favor of Mary Machado on the ground of
extreme cruelty and refused to grant a divorce to defendant
and cross-complainant John Machado. The court determined
the character of various items of property, and awarded plaintiff alimony, custody of the two minor children, $75 per month
for each child as support and maintenance, and exclusive possession of the joint tenancy family residence property until
further order of the court. The court also enjoined defendant
from molesting, annoying, or striking plaintiff. No appeal
was taken from the interlocutory decree of divorce, but both
parties appeal from other parts of the judgment.
Property Rights
The parties were married in June 1950 and separated in
March 1959. At the time of the marriage plaintiff owned no
separate property. Defendant had title to three parcels of
ranch land (40, 38 and 2 acres respectively), various items of
farming equipment, cattle, an automobile, and a $40,000 savings account. Although he paid for the 40-acre and the
2-acre parcels before the marriage, he had paid only $3,000
of the $12,000 purchase price on the 38-acre parcel. It is conceded that after the marriage he paid $1,700 on this parcel
with his separate funds.
During the marriage defendant devoted all of his working
time and energy to farming and dairy operations on the three
parcels and on another 40-acre parcel leased from his father.
All income during the marriage was derived from these operations, except interest on the spouses' $8,500 joint savings and
loan account and defendant's $40,000 account. The proceeds
of the farm ,nd dairy were deposited in a single commercial
bank account. All expenditures were made from this account,
including payments for the balance due on the 38-acre parcel
($7,300) and for the family residence property, household
furniture, a 1959 Oldsmobile, farming and dairy equipment,
and cattle.
The trial court determined that the parties owned no community property, that they owned as joint tenants the family
residence and the $8,500 savings account, and that defendant
owned as his separate property the three parcels of ranch

( let. 1062 J

MACHADO V. MACHADO
(58 C.2d 501; 25 Ca1.Rptr. 87. 375 P.2d 551

505

land, all farming equipment, tractors and cattle, the 1959
Oldsmobile, the household furniture, and thc $40,000 savings
account. In doing so the court relied 011 Estate of Pepper,
158 Cal. 619, 623·624 [112 P. 62, 31 L.R.A. N.S. 1092], and
held that the agricultural income of defendant's separate property and the property purchased with this income was entirely his separate property. [1] In Estate of Neilson, 57
Cal.2d 733, 741 [22 Cal.Rptr. 1, 371 P.2d 745], we overruled
the Pepper ease and held that the part of the profits of a
separate property enterprise attributable to the husband's
efforts are community property, whether the enterprise be
classified as "commercial" or "agricultural."
[2] The spouses' federal income tax returns indicate that
from the date of the marriage until the end of 1959 the net
income of the enterprise after federal income taxes averaged
approximately $170 per month. 1 This income should have
been apportioned between defendant's separate property and
the community property. Unless expenditures for family living expenses exceeded the amount apportioned to the community propcrty,2 community funds were used for some of
the payments for real and personal property, thus giving the
community an interest in one or more of the items found to
be d~fendant 's separate property.
Plaintiff and defendant challenge the findings that the
family residence and the $8,500 savings and loan association
accou.nt are joint tenancy property. Both parties maintain
that they did not intend to create joint tenancies and that
the home and savings account have the same character as their
source, i.e., the receipts from the farming and dairy enterprise.a
[Sa] Each party testified that when the family residence
was purchased they did not instruct the bank handling the
transaction to put the deed in joint tenancy. Plaintiff testified
that she went to the bank and signed papers when defendant
told her to do so. Defendant testified that he signed papers
at the bank at a different time, that he did not see plaintiff's

•

'This figure includes the full amount of capital gains realized from the
sale of cattle and excludes interest payments on the two savings accounts.
"No evidence of family living expenses was introduced at the trial.
"Plaintiff contends that these receipts were entirely community property because they represent defendant's earnings during the marriage;
defendant contends that t.hey were entirely separate property on the
authority of Estate of Pepper, supra. To the extent that these receipts
were profits of the enterprise, neither contention can be Bustained.
(Estate of Nei~cm, npra.)
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name on the deed, and that he did not intend to give her an
interest in the house.
[ 4] Although a joint tenancy (Ieed is not conclusive as
to the character of real property, it creates a rebuttable presumption that it is held in joint tcnancy. The presumption
created by the ueed cannot be overcome by testimony of the
l)idden intentions of one of the parties, bnt only by evidence
tending to prove a common understanding or an agreement
that the character of the property was to be other than joint
tenancy. [ 3 b] Sincc there was no evidence of a common
understanding or an agreement the presumption was not
overcome. (Gtldelj v. G-udelj, 41 Ca1.2d 202, 212-213 [259 P.
2d 656]; Bocol v. King, 36 Ca1.2d 342, 345-346 [223 P.2d
627] .)
Similar principles apply to the joint savings and loan account. Financial Code section 7602 provides: "When shares
or investment certificates are issucd in the name of two or more
persons whethcr minor or adult as joint tenants or in form to
be paid to any of them or the surviyors of them, such shares
or certificates and all dues paid thereon become the property
of such persons as joint tenants."· [5] In Paterson v.
Comastri,39 Ca1.2d 66, 71 [244 P.2d 902], we held that similar
language applying to joint bank accounts now contained in
Financial Code section 852 created a rebuttable presumption
of joint tenancy that may be overcome by proof that the
owner of the funds, when making the deposit, did not intend
to create a true joint tenauey-. This holding applies also to
section 7602. (See Pruyn v. Waterman, 172 Cal.App.2d 133,
136-137 [342 P.2d 87].) [6] Whethcr the presumption was
overcome was a question of fact for the trial court. (Gttdelj V.
Gudelj, supra; Paterson V. Comastri, SUP"Q, 3!) Cal.2d at p. 73.)
[7] Defendant withdrew all the money from the joint account without plaintiff's consent immediately after the parties
separated. He had the savings and loan association transfer
$3,500 to a ne,v account established in his and another person's
llame and received a check for the remainder of the funds. He
offered no evidence as to the disposition of· these funds. The
trial court t~refore should have provided in the judgment
in accordance with its memorandum opinion that defendant ac'This section did not become operative until 1953. At the time the
spouses' account was opened in 1952, it was controlled by almost exactly
the same language contained in Building and Loan Association Act,
~ 8.04, Stats. 1931, ch. 269, p. 514, as amended by State. 1951, eh. 451,
p. 1472.
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count for half the amount of thc plu·til.'s' joint account at the
time that account was closed.
Defendant contends, and plaintiff concedes, that the trial
court had no jurisdiction to award plaintiff the exclusive use
and possession of the family residence until further order of
the court.
[ 8 ] In a divorce action the court does not have the authority to award any of the separate property of one spouse
to the other. (Fox v. Fox, 18 Ca1.2d 645, 646 [117 P.2d 325].)
Neither can it award the wife exclusive possession of real
property owned by the spous<'s as joint tenants. (Carter v.
Carter, 148 Cal.App.2d 845, 848-849 [307 P.2d 630] ; Jenlcins
v. Jcn7cins. 110 Cal.App.2d 663. 665 [243 r.2d 79] ; Barba v.
Barba, 103 Cal.App.2d 395, 396 [229 P.2d 465]), except as
provided in Civil Code seetion 157. That section provides that
in divorce proceedings" the eourt may make orders for temporary exelusion of either party from the family dwelling or
from the dwelling of the other, until the final detl.'rmination
of the action." (Sec also Code Civ. Proc., § 949a.) [9] The
purpose of this section is to protect the spouse's right to the
exclusive occupancy of his or her or the family dwelling pending final determination of the action. [10] The trial court
therefore erred in awarding plaintiff not simply the exclusive
right to oceupy the dwelling but also the exclusive right to use
it in any way she might see fit. Moreover, its order was not
limited in time to the final determination of the action.
Child Support Award
[11] There is no merit in defendant's contention that he
does not have the ability to pay the child support award of
$75 per month for eaeh child. His total income from 1954
through 1959 averaged approximately $300 per month after
the payment of federal income taxes, and he owns assets of
substantial value.
The Injunction
Defendant attacks the injunction that restrains him from
molesting, anhoying, or striking plaintiff. The word "striking," as conceded by plaintiff, must be deleted from the order
because there is no evidence that defendant struck or threatened to strike plaintiff. (De Havila1ld v. Warner Bros. Picfures, Inc., 67 Cal.App.2d 225, 238 [153 P.2d 983] ; PeopZe v.
Robin, 56 Ca1.App.2d 885, 887 [133 P.2d 436].)
[12a] There is no merit in defendant's contention that
the words" molesting" and "an Boying" are so vague and un-
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certain as to rendcr the injunction voiu.(See People v. Moore,
137 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [290 P.2d 40] ; PMple v. Pallares, 112
Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901 [246 P.2d 173].) [13] The language of the injunction must be interpreted in the light of the
record {City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 509,514
(241 P.2d 243] ; Gelfand v. O'Haver, 33 Cal.2d 218, 222 [200
P .2d 790] ) which discloses the kind of conduct enjoined. (Compare Gottlieb v. Superior Court, 168 Cal.App.2d 309, 312 [335
P.2d 714].) [12b] On several occasions defendant made
unfounded accusations that plaintiff had committed adultery
and used abusive language in her presence; he twice parked
his truck within sight of the family home and a strange man
came from the truck to the front door of the house and asked
plaintiff if a "sporting girl" was there; and he sometimes
locked plaintiff out of the house late at night so that once she
was required to have a policeman help her gain entry.
The judgment is affirmed insofar as it awards alimony and
child support, adjudges that the family residence is held in
joint tenancy, adjudges that the savings and loan account was
held in joint tenancy, and enjoins defendant from molesting
or annoying plaintiff. In all other respects the parts of the
judgment appealed from are reversed. Defendant shall bear
the costs of these appeals.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Tobriner, J., concurred.
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